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1 Introduction
Easley and O’Hara (1992) show how trading volume aﬀects the speed of price adjustment in a
market with asymmetric information. They have the following setting. Group of informed traders
are ﬁxed and they have identical private information about the value of the asset. Other traders
do not have such private information. At each time, one randomly chosen trader can place one
unit of sell/buy order. A market maker determines the price without knowing whether the trader
has the private information or not. The market maker learns from the past trading history, so that
the bid-ask spread (resp. the price) converges to zero (the strong-form eﬃcient level) exponentially
over time.
They assume that the ratio of informed trader is ﬁxed as µ over time. However this assumption
may be taken as quintessential assurance of information revelation in their result. In a practical
sense, we should analyze the decision making problem that includes endogenous choices. Once we
consider the cost, it is not apparent whether the price converges to the strong-form eﬃcient level
or not. When a chosen trader knows that the price enough reﬂects the information, he may not
try to spend his money to get the private information. Then the market maker may expect that
there are not so many traders who have the private information in the past trade, and set the wide
bid/ask spread. This may not result in the exponential convergence shown in their paper.
Unfortunately it is diﬃcult to extend the model in Easley and O’Hara (1992) to the one
endogenizing information choices directly. The fact that the market maker remembers all the past
trade might be the cause of the diﬃculty to analyze. Therefore we change the setting by assuming
the traders’ limited memories, and analyze their evolutionary decision making. We obtain the
result in which the ratio of the informed traders is proportional to the width of the bid ask spread,
and the price converges to the strong-form eﬃcient level exponentially as is shown in Easley and
O’Hara (1992).
2 Model
We consider the trading in a day. The eventual value of the asset is represented by a random
variable V . Before the start of the trading day, an information event that relates to the asset value
occurs with the probability α, where 0 < α < 1. If the information event occurs, the fraction µ
of the traders can know the occurrence of the information event, and observe the identical signal.
We require that 0 < µ < 1. The other 1 − µ traders and the market maker do not observe it.
Formally, we deﬁne an information event as the occurrence of a signal Ψ about V . The signal can
take one of two values, L and H, with probabilities δ > 0 and 1 − δ > 0 respectively. We let the
expected value of the asset conditional on the signal be E [V |Ψ = L] = V or E [V |Ψ = H] = V . If
no information event has occurred, we denote this as Ψ = 0 and the expected value of the asset
simply remains at its unconditional level V ∗ = δV + (1 − δ)V .
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1Then a randomly chosen trader comes to the market and places one unit of sell/buy order one
by one. The market maker sets the bid/ask prices before each order.
Informed traders are risk-neutral and take prices as given. She will buy if she has seen a high
signal and an ask price below V ; she will sell if she has seen a low signal and a bid price above V .
An trade for liquidity reasons such as the timing of consumption or portfolio considerations




. If it is not the case, she
does not want to trade, because the quotes should be unproﬁtable for her.
We assume that the market maker is risk-neutral and acts competitively. That is, his price
quotes yield zero expected proﬁt conditional on a trade at the quotes.
This trading structure can be understood most easily by the tree diagram given in Figure 1.
Figure 1
At the ﬁrst node nature selects whether the information event occurs. If there is an information
event, then the type of signal (either L or H) is determined at the second node. These two nodes
are reached only at the beginning of the day. Traders are selected at each time t to trade based
on the probabilities described above. Thus, if an information event has occurred, an informed
trader is selected with probability µ, and she then chooses either to buy or sell. Similarly, with
probability 1−µ an uninformed trader is selected and she may choose to buy, sell or not trade with
the indicated probabilities. For trade in the next time interval, only the trader selection process is
repeated, so that the game proceeds from the right dotted line on the tree diagram. This continues
throughout the day.
The market maker is Bayesian who has limited memory. He does not know whether the
information event has occurred, whether it is good or bad news given that it has occurred, or
whether any particular trader is informed. Each market participant can watch the market. Over
time, this allows the market maker to learn whether the information event has occurred and whether
it is good or bad news given that it has occurred and revise his belief. But he cannot remember
all past trades. He remembers only m outcomes of the past trading. That is, he remembers the
number of the buy orders β, sell orders s, and no trade n (β + s + n ≤ m) in the past trades.
Note that the quotes submitted by the market maker depend not on the entire history but only
on the ratios of the number of each order (See Proposition 3 in Easley and O’Hara (1992)). He
can remember all the past trades before the time m. At t (t > m), he randomly forgets one of m
outcomes in his memory at t − 1 with equal probabilities, and remembers the new outcome at t.1
1He does not believe that he will forget one outcome. When he set the quotes, he considers the m + 1 trade (m
past outcomes and a potential sell/buy/no-trade order at the present time) as is noted below.
2With a calculation similar to the one in Easley and O’Hara (1992), the market maker’s beliefs
given his memory are given by:







β + (1 − µ)
n [αδ (µ + (1 − µ)ϵS)
s ((1 − µ)ϵB)
β + α(1 − δ)((1 − µ)ϵS)
s (µ + (1 − µ)ϵB)
β]
.
The probabilities of low and high signals are calculated similarly.
Since beliefs depend on (n,s,β), quotes will also depend on these variables. The bid b and the
ask a can be written as:
b = Pr{Ψ = L|(n,s + 1,β)}V
+ Pr{Ψ = H|(n,s + 1,β)}V + Pr{Ψ = 0|(n,s + 1,β)}V ∗, and
a = Pr{Ψ = L|(n,s,β + 1)}V
+ Pr{Ψ = H|(n,s,β + 1)}V + Pr{Ψ = 0|(n,s,β + 1)}V ∗.
We line up Ψ, n,s, and β and deﬁne the collection as a state. We can calculate the transition
probabilities between all pairs of the states, and regard the process as Markov process. This
process is not irreducible. For example, (L,·,·,·) is not accessible from (H,·,·,·). We can ﬁnd




When we ﬁx a outcome of Ψ = L, H, or 0 arbitrary, “partial processes” in which the set of states
consists of n + s + β = m are ﬁnite, irreducible, and recurrent. Therefore each partial process
has a unique stationary distribution. Multiplying these stationary distributions given Ψ by the
probabilities of Ψ occurring, the distribution of the union of them is also stationary, which we call
stationary state.
3 Stationary State
In this section, we solve the stationary state analytically.













β if Ψ = L




β if Ψ = H, and




β if Ψ = 0
,
where
pn (Ψ) = Pr{No Trade|Ψ},
ps (Ψ) = Pr{Sell|Ψ}, and





is probability distribution because x(Ψ,n,s,β) ≥ 0 holds for every Ψ,n,s,β, and
∑
Ψ,n,s,β
x(Ψ,n,s,β) = αδ (pn (L) + ps (L) + pβ (L))
3
+ α(1 − δ)(pn (H) + ps (H) + pβ (H))
3
+ (1 − α)(pn (0) + ps (0) + pβ (0))
3
= 1.
3The transition probabilities in both the entire process and the partial processes are


































Pr{(Ψ,n,s,β) → others} = 0.

































































































0! = 1, and (−1)! = 0.
4 Evolutionary Decision Making on Free Entry
We slightly change the setting of the model in this section. We assume that the traders can choose
either to get the information by bearing the expenses, or not. The ratio of traders who can get the
information is µ at the initial state. One trader is randomly chosen before the trading, and she
can decide either to get the information with the cost c > 0, or not. She expects that the present
state is the stationary state on that occasion. If she chooses to get information (resp. does not get
information), the value of µ becomes greater (less) than now in a small range. If she chooses to get
the information, and if the information event occurs, then she can get the information. Otherwise,
her behavior does not depend on her choice, and she behave as an uninformed trader. We can
4calculate the stationary state under the new µ. Another trader is randomly chosen in the new
stationary state, and she makes the same decision... We call the state where both choices between
acquiring and not acquiring are indiﬀerent each other as a stable state.
The following scenario may facilitate the understandings. The traders often get up late. The
market has already opened, and there are too many trade outcomes for the market maker to
remember because of his limited memory m. The state in the market seems to have converged
to the stationary state. The proportion µ of the traders subscribe the newspapers, and can read
them before they trade. Since they get up now, they do not know if important events occurred
today until they read the newspaper. The market maker is busy and has no time to read the
newspaper. The fee of subscription is c. After reading the newspaper, she can place her order
once in order to maximize her today’s payoﬀ. Even if she can not get the information and if she
does not want to trade, she may have to buy or sell with the probabilities ϵB or ϵS. A newspaper
gentry goes door-to-door and solicits subscriptions at a pace of a house a day (probably after the
trading hours). When the newspaper gentry comes, a trader can choose whether she enters her
subscription, renews, or cancels. The market maker knows how many people read the newspapers.
What is a stable state in such a dynamic? When the number of traders who read the newspapers
is too small (resp. large), it is diﬃcult (easy) for the market maker to learn through the outcomes,
the price reﬂects the information less (more), and the value of reading the newspaper is large
(small), which results in the increase (decrease) of the willingness for the traders to read the
newspapers. Reading and not reading must be indiﬀerent in the stable state.
Now we can prove that the average value of the bid-ask spread is proportional to µ in the stable
state.
Proposition 2 Suppose that ϵS = ϵB. Then, in the stable state the following holds:
∑
x(Ψ,n,s,β) (a − b) =
µ
ϵS c,
where a − b is the bid-ask spread when the memories are (n,s,β).
Proof. Denote the expected payoﬀ of the trader paying c as X, and not paying as Y . Since the
expected payoﬀ of the market maker is zero,
µX + (1 − µ)Y = 0.
On the other hand, there is no diﬀerence between paying and not paying for the trader,
X − c = Y.
Therefore
µc = −Y.
Since the bid-ask spread depends on µ, it is diﬃcult to express it as the function of µ explicitly.
In order to understand the behavior of µ, we see simple numerical examples in what follows.
The ﬁgure below shows the relationship between m and µ in the stable states in the case where
V = 100, V = 0, α = 0.9, ϵS = ϵB = 0.05, and c = 1. µ and the average value of the bid-ask
spread decrease exponentially with the capacity of memory m. Thus, we show that the prices
converge to the strong form eﬃcient level of the price exponentially over time (as is shown in
Easley and O’Hara (1992)) in the model in which the traders can choose whether they get the
5private information or not.
Figure 2
Intuitively, as m becomes greater, the market maker can learn more from the past trade ﬂow,
and the asymmetric information is eased. He can put small bid-ask spread since the loss by the
trade with informed traders is less. Since paying information cost is fruitless, the traders become
less willing to get the information. Even if they may have to trade for liquidity reasons, the loss is
not large so much because the price is almost strong form eﬃcient. The above result holds with
various parameters.
5 Conclusion
We analyze the model in which the traders can choose either to get private information or not
when the capacity of memory of the market maker is limited. We obtain the result that the prices
exponentially converge to the strong-form eﬃcient level.
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